A Shiite Houthi rebel mans a checkpoint in Sanaa, Oct. 9, 2014. (photo by REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah)
Translator(s)Sahar Ghoussoub
Yemen entered a new era Sept. 21 after
Sanaa's fall, which will change the country's map for the next decade or
two. Still, the implications of this historic event and its risks have
not been carefully examined. Instead, the UN envoy and the Yemeni
parties have been preoccupied in covering what happened under the banner
of a
fragile agreement that claims to uphold national peace and partnership.
Summary⎙ Print Many scenarios explain the fall of Sanaa to the hands of Houthis and the period that will follow in Yemen.
This agreement will fail to stop the war machine in the
country because it's simply a political covenant imposed by the weapons
of the militia rather than the state. It's an agreement trying to
legitimize the fall of the capital and cover the truth on the ground,
which is the collapse of the Yemeni state and its replacement by militia
forces taking control of its streets and expanding militarily to the
rest of the country’s provinces.
First and foremost, it's important to shed light on the scenarios put forth by
analysts concerning the capital's fall. According to the first scenario, President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi had previously agreed to
let the Houthis enter Sanaa to
get rid of the Muslim Brotherhood’s military wing in Yemen, with
regional and international consent, but the Houthis did not play by the
rules. They did overthrow the Brotherhood’s military wing, but also some
of the state’s institutions, such as the national TV station. According
to a Yemeni affairs expert who wished to remain anonymous for security
reasons, the
Omani mediation reached an agreement between Hadi and the Houthis to oust the
Islah military wing, but the Houthis breached the agreement.
The agreement also comes in the context of fighting terrorism, as the
Islamic State (IS) fighters are expected to flee from Iraq and Syria to
Yemen. Some analysts such as Gregory Johnson, who wrote “Last Refuge”
about al-Qaeda in Yemen, and
Ibrahim Sharqieh hold that the West saw the best way to fight al-Qaeda as through the Houthis instead of the weak Yemeni government.
According to this scenario, a religious party such as the Islah Party
— which has a broad political movement, takes part in the peaceful
political process and recognizes the elections and the constitution —
has been replaced with religious militias that do not have any political
movement or experience and would rule by force. This suggests that the
political process in Yemen has been fully undermined and the country is
being dragged into conflicts, while all political options to prevent a
civil war have been eliminated.
Such a war would be sectarian, even if some argue that Yemen has
never seen a sectarian war before. However, this does not mean that
following the collapse of the state, Yemeni society would not fall into
this quagmire, with the regional sectarian tension affecting Yemenis.
This is especially true given the media hype and the foreign financial
support of the different parties to the Yemeni conflict, in addition to
the fact that the Zaydis are located in the far north of Yemen. This
would give a regional aspect to the already existing sectarian tension
in the country, as Yemen has already been through past wars between
regions. Sanaa has witnessed
armed clashes between both camps to control the mosques.
Al-Qaeda was once merely some armed groups in the mountains, received
temporarily by certain tribes. Today, we find them forging political
alliances with tribes that view the Houthis as enemies. This is taking
place in the tribal Al-Bayda governorate in eastern Yemen, whose
tribes have allied with al-Qaeda
against the Houthis. Indeed, the organization has expanded to new areas
in response to Houthi control, as is the case in al-Udayn district in
the
Ibb governorate, which fell in their hands.
There is another possible scenario. Hadi has been working with
international and regional support, within the context of dividing
Yemen. This scheme ostensibly aims to drown the north in chaos and
sectarian war while establishing a state in the south to protect the
international waterways under Yemeni control, especially since most of
the Yemeni coastline is located in the south. Most of its military camps
and heavy weapons have been moved to the south under the pretext of
fighting terrorism, but with no order to take action when the Houthis
headed toward Sanaa and took over.
In this context, Nayef Hassan, editor-in-chief of Al-Sharea, told
Al-Monitor that many officers from the north talked to the newspaper
about their concerns and doubts over the transfer of the Scud missiles
and some of the surface-to-surface missiles to the south of the country,
in addition to the warplanes that were also moved to the southern Al
Anad air base. They said that fighting al-Qaeda does not require all
these weapons in the south.
The scheme to divide Yemen has been on the table for a long time now.
This plan was covered by the Saudi media and in an article by
Nidaa Hilal,
the former media adviser to the UN envoy to Yemen, Jamal Benomar.
According to Hilal, the alternative plan appears to be to divide Yemen
into two parts: a northern part under Houthi control and another
southern part. At first sight, this might sound like a solution, as it
would secure the shipping lines and the southern coastline. However,
this plan does not seem likely to happen.
For now, Yemen is in principle divided at the levels of tribes, sects
and regions and is unlikely to be divided into just two parts. Al-Qaeda
has expanded in the south, taking advantage of the political turmoil.
This state would be a battlefield for a proxy war between the
Iran-backed movements and other groups that are supported by
Saudi Arabia,
which would further fuel the already inflamed regional conflict. Thus,
the establishment of a stable state in the south is not viable, as it
would only deepen the rifts between southerners themselves.
Yemenis and the entire world have lost a golden opportunity to help
Yemen move toward a more stable and less corrupt democratic system
through the excessive dependence on group and movement affiliations
rather than on the state institutions’ support. Also to blame are the
extension of the transition period to avoid holding elections, the
renewal of a failed president and the appointment of a UN envoy with
such a daunting mission.
Hope for Yemen does not lie in this peace agreement while trying to
form a government for a failed state. The agreement seeks to appoint a
prime minister in a country ruled by a president who cannot achieve his
missions and form a government for a state with no control and unable to
operate its institutions. Meanwhile, the militias have taken over the
largest military power in the country.
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