BERLIN – During the
long night of negotiations over Greece on July 12-13, something
fundamental to the European Union cracked. Since then, Europeans have
been living in a different kind of EU.
What
changed that night was the Germany that Europeans have known since the
end of World War II. On the surface, the negotiations were about
averting a Greek exit from the eurozone (or “Grexit”) and the dire
consequences that would follow for Greece and the monetary union. At a
deeper level, however, what was at stake was the role in Europe of its
most populous and economically most powerful country.
Germany’s resurgence
after World War II, and its re-establishment of the world’s trust
(culminating in consent to German re-unification four and a half decades
later), was built on sturdy domestic and foreign-policy pillars. At
home, a stable democracy based on the rule of law quickly emerged. The
economic success of Germany’s welfare state proved a model for Europe.
And Germans’ willingness to face up to the Nazis’ crimes, without
reservation, sustained a deep-rooted skepticism toward all things
military.
In terms of foreign
policy, Germany rebuilt trust by embracing Western integration and
Europeanization. The power at the center of Europe should never again
become a threat to the continent or itself. Thus, the Western Allies’
aim after 1945 – unlike after World War I – was not to isolate Germany
and weaken it economically, but to protect it militarily and firmly
embed it politically in the West. Indeed, Germany’s reconciliation with
its arch-enemy, France, remains the foundation of today’s European
Union, helping to incorporate Germany into the common European market,
with a view to the eventual political unification of Europe.
But in today’s
Germany, such ideas are considered hopelessly “Euro-romantic”; their
time has passed. Where Europe is concerned, from now on Germany will
primarily pursue its national interests, just like everybody else.
But such thinking is
based on a false premise. The path that Germany will pursue in the
twenty-first century – toward a “European Germany” or a “German Europe” –
has been the fundamental, historical question at the heart of German
foreign policy for two centuries. And it was answered during that long
night in Brussels, with German Europe prevailing over European Germany.
This was a fateful
decision for both Germany and Europe. One wonders whether Chancellor
Angela Merkel and Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble knew what they were
doing.
To dismiss the fierce
criticism of Germany and its leading players that erupted after the
diktat on Greece, as many Germans do, is to don rose-tinted glasses.
Certainly, there was nonsensical propaganda about a Fourth Reich and
asinine references to the Führer. But, at its core, the criticism
articulates an astute awareness of Germany’s break with its entire
post-WWII European policy.
For the first time,
Germany didn’t want more Europe; it wanted less. Germany’s stance on the
night of July 12-13 announced its desire to transform the eurozone from
a European project into a kind of sphere of influence. Merkel was
forced to choose between Schäuble and France (and Italy).
The issue was
fundamental: Her finance minister wanted to compel a eurozone member to
leave “voluntarily” by exerting massive pressure. Greece could either
exit (in full knowledge of the disastrous consequences for the country
and Europe) or accept a program that effectively makes it a European
protectorate, without any hope of economic improvement. Greece is now
subject to a cure – further austerity – that has not worked in the past
and that was prescribed solely to address Germany’s domestic political
needs.
But the massive
conflict with France and Italy, the eurozone’s second and third largest
economies, is not over, because, for Schäuble, Grexit remains an option.
By claiming that debt relief is “legally” possible only outside the
eurozone, he wants to turn the issue into the lever for bringing about a
“voluntary” Grexit.
Schäuble’s position
has thrown into sharp relief the fundamental question of the
relationship between Europe’s south and north, his approach threatens to
stretch the eurozone to the breaking point. The belief that the euro
can be used to bring about the economic “re-education” of Europe’s south
will prove a dangerous fallacy – and not just in Greece. As the French
and Italians well know, such a view jeopardizes the entire European project, which has been built on diversity and solidarity.
Germany has been the
big winner of European unification, both economically and politically.
Just compare Germany’s history in the first and second halves of the
twentieth century. Bismarck’s unification of Germany in the nineteenth
century occurred at the high-water mark of European nationalism.
Militarism became intimately associated with German power. Indeed,
Germany’s public philosophy, unlike that of France, Great Britain, or
the United States, never incorporated a civilizing ideal to justify the
use of military power.
The foundation of the
second, unified German nation-state in 1989 was based on Germany’s
irrevocable Western orientation and Europeanization. And the
Europeanization of Germany’s politics filled – and still fills – the
civilization gap embodied in German statehood. To allow this pillar to
erode – or, worse, to tear it down – is a folly of the highest order.
That is why, in the EU that emerged on the morning of July 13, Germany and Europe both stand to lose.
Project Syndicate – Joschka Fischer *
* Joschka Fischer was German Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor from 1998-2005,
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